Archivo de etiquetas | "Sudan"

TPLF – Ethiopia conflict: implications for the humanitarian crisis

Etiquetas: , , , , , , , , ,

TPLF – Ethiopia conflict: implications for the humanitarian crisis

Fecha 20/12/2020 por Raimundo Gregoire Delaunoy

Since the start of the confrontation between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the international community has been worried about the consequences for the population that currenly lives in the Tigray regional state but also in the bordering areas. While millions of people face precarity, in the Tigray the situation could be even worse, as the conflict threatens to imply other ethiopian states and countries like Sudan and Eritrea.

(Militaries of the Ethiopian National Forces)

Raimundo Gregoire Delaunoy | December 19th, 2020

At the end of 2018, Ethiopia had nearly 3,000,000 internal displaced people (IDP) and some months later the number increased up to a 3,080,000 record-high. Since then, thanks to Abiy Ahmed’s policy of return, an estimated number of 1,800,000 IDPs had returned to their original location in June 2019. Nevertheless, the situation once again worsened and, in fact, as reported by the Ethiopia Displacement Report 5 (June-July 2020), the number of IDPs changed from 1,606,086 in September-October 2019 to 1,820,811 in June-July 2020. In relation to this, it is necessary to point out that 1,233,557 of the IDPs registered in the mentioned report have been displaced due to conflicts in the place of origin. Droughts (351,062), seasonal floods (104,696) and flash floods (50,093) are the following main sources of displacement but way far from the first one. So, in the current context of war between the Ethiopian federal government and the TPLF, these numbers should be monitored with special attention.

In the regional state of Tigray, the report says that there are 100,266 internally displaced (+0,7% in relation to the previous report), with 48,084 displaced households. All of the 100,266 internally displaced escaped from conflict, concentrating in the Eastern and Southeastern zones of the Tigray. Concerning the newly arrived IDPs, they have been located in the Western and Southern zones.

Tigray has 1,504 non-functioning latrines on-site, being the second regional state with the highest number and only surpassed by Oromia (1,916). Also, there are five sites with no access to food and the whole region has 600,000 food beneficiaries. Finally, only 14% IDP households in Tigray owe livestock.

Concerning health issues, in 45% of the sites in Tigray pneumonia is the main concern, followed by diarrhea (20%). In relation to the Covid-19 pandemia, the Tigray region has registered 121 infections, converting it in the national leader. In order to have a better notion of the situation, Oromia and Amhara come in the second and third place, but only with six and five cases, respectively.

Lastly, it is worth checking the figures of refugees and asylum seekers in Ethiopia. Currently, Ethiopia is home to 796,437 refugees and asylum seekers, of which 12.4% live in the Tigray regional state. Of the total population of refugees and asylum seekers residing in Ethiopia, 178,315 (22%) are Eritrean citizens, with  96,223 of this latter ones living in the regional state of Tigray and mainly in four camps located in the western part of the Tigray. The other Eritreans live in the neighbouring region of Afar (54,000) and in Addis Abeba (28,000). Concerning the Sudanese, even if they only represent 5.5% of the country’s population of refugees and asylum seekers, it should not be forgotten that, with 43,789 people, they are the fourth most populous group in the country.

What about the other countries?

     In Sudan, there are 990,223 refugees and asylum seekers, while the number of internally displaced people is 1,885,782. Most of the refugees and asylum seekers come from South Sudan (729,530), Eritrea (121,337) and Siria (93,497). Ethiopians appear in the fifth place (13,112).

About the bordering states with Ethiopia, the Kassala state has 100,347 refugees and asylum seekers (10.1% of the country’s total),  being followed by Al Qadarif with 20,549 (2.1%), Sennar with 9,899 (1%) and Blue Nile with 3,726 (0.4%).

In Eritrea, there are only 199 refugees living in the Eritrean territory and there are no figures for internally displaced people. This, because the country has an autocratic government (without euphemisms, a dictatorship) and it has not signed the international refugee convention, nor the statelessness convention. Also, Eritrea does not have a national asylum legislation. Therefore, it is very difficult to really know how many IDPs, refugees and asylum seekers reside in the country (International ONGs are prohibited in Eritrea and just a few United Nations’ agencies, such as FAO, UNHCR and UNICEF, have received authorisation to work in the country).

Consequences of the current conflict

     Before the military confrontation started, nearly 2.3 million children needed humanitarian assistance in the Tigray regional state, a figure that was reafirmed by Unicef on November 19. In total, about 8.4 million people need humanitarian assistance in Ethiopia

Concering the refugees, according to the UNHCR, 51.068 people arrived to Sudan from Ethiopia. The figure takes into account the period between November 7 and December 17. Since November 10, there is an average of 1.340 people per day (the number started to decrease but during November and December it passed the 2.000 barrier), while since November 21 can be seen a decrease in the daily number of refugees entering Sudan. About this latter, Kassala state hosts 35.762 refugees (70%), while Gedaref and Blue Nile states shelter 14.604 (29%) and 702 (1%), respectively.

According to FAO, Eastern Africa had 133.1 million people undernourished in 2018. It is a very worrying situation, as the number has been consistently increasing since 2005. Even more, Eastern Africa leads the continent and the world in the prevalence item, with 30.8% of its population being undernourished in 2018. What is even worse is that the same report establishes that 62.7% of Eastern Africa’s population suffer from moderate or severe food insecurity.  In the particular case of Ethiopia, the economic growth of the country since 2007 has had a positive effect in the food security issue. Even if it is still a humanitarian crisis, the population facing hunger has dropped from 61% (2007) to 31% (2017), while prevalence of undernourishment has fallen from 47.1% during the 2000-2002 period to 19.7% in 2017-2019 interval . In relation with the current year, the World Food Programme assisted 5.5 million people between January-September 2020 and 11.8 million people fase acute food insecurity. In addition, 38% of the children between six and 59 months suffer of chronic malnutrition. Still more, the same source claims that 3.9 million women and children are nutritionaly vulnerable. Finally, it is important to see how Ethiopia’s situation in this issue has been seen by international rankings. According to the Food Security Index, Ethiopia is in the ‘moderate performance’ group (91th of 113 countries in the list), whereas the Global Hunger Index rates the country in the ‘serious’ category. Nevertheless, it has to be said that Ethiopia has been experiencing a constant improvement, as in 2000 was ranked as ‘extremely alarming’ but then, in 2006 and 2012,  it was placed in the ‘alarming’ category. Lastly, in 2020, the country has entered the ‘serious’ category and not so far from the ‘moderate’ one, which would be an impressive improvement since 2000.

The problem is that conflicts and droughts are the main factors that explain this situation. Therefore, what has been hapenning between the Federal Government of Ethiopia and the TPLF is a big threat to the population that already face a humanitarian crisis but also to those who are on the edge of it. Even worse, roads were blocked for a long time (during the conflict), while electricity, internet and phone are shut down. Thus, the humanitarian organizations have not been able to give aid and, in fact, between November 4 and December 3, only three humanitarian organisations obtained a partial access to the region. According to UNICEF, on December 15, 2.3 million children in need of humanitarian assistance in Tigray were out ot reach due to the military conflict, something that could worsen the already complicated situation in that regional state.

In this context, it is important to highlight that besides the eventual consequences of the confrontation between the Ethiopia federal government and the TPLF, Ethiopia, Sudan and Eritrea have been facing other menaces, like the COVID-19 pandemia, desert locusts’ invasion, economic crisis and huge and historical floods. All these events have already deepened the humanitarian crisis in the region (in Sudan, 9.3 million people need humanitarian assistance, while in Ethiopia the number is 15 million, with nearly 2 million of them living in the regional state of Tigray) and, therefore, it has to be understood that the military conflict has worsened the already worrying and dramatic context. In fact, even the current pandemia of Covid-19 seems to be less important, something that obviously worries local and international authorities. On the same hand, the fate of the Eritrean refugees living in the Tigray regional state is a source of concern, as the UNHCR has declared. For example, on November 26, the Islamic Relief said that the Tigray refugee families could run out of food, something that may be even worse as the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) projected, for the February – June 2020 period, an increase of the acute food insecurity in the Tigray regional state (the projection for June 2020 establishes that 17.1% of Tigray regional state’s population would be in ‘crisis’ (16.6%) or ‘emergency’ (0.5%)). In addition, IPC also established that 8.6 million should face high levels of acute food insecurity during the October – December 2020 period.

Furthermore, the last report of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) has demonstrated the dramatic situation in the region. Among other issues, there is shortage of vital (food, water, fuel and cash) and medical supplies, while food prices have doubled or tripled. Even more, people must walk even 25 kilometers in order to get water. The worst of all is that La Niña phenomena could generate rainfalls bellow the normal numbers. This could drive millions of people into hunger, as the Oxford Committee for Relief (Oxfam) declared on December 11.

Lastly, there have been incidents of violence against civilians, something that even if it is not a new issue, still has dramatic consequences. As an example, a massacre of at least 600 people has been confirmed in May Kadra, a village in the Tigray region.

* Raimundo Gregoire Delaunoy is a journalist and bachelor in Social Communication. He also has a Master in International Studies.

Comentarios (0)

Key elements to understand the Ethiopia – TPLF tension

Etiquetas: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Key elements to understand the Ethiopia – TPLF tension

Fecha 6/11/2020 por Raimundo Gregoire Delaunoy

On November 3, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) attacked an army base of Ethiopia’s federal government. Immediately after, Abiy Ahmed, Prime Minister of Ethiopia, announced that they would respond with a military offensive. The following hours were too tense as telecommunications were shut down and the air space in the northern region of the country was closed. Furthermore, the Federal Council of Ministers declared a six-month state of emergency.

Raimundo Gregoire Delaunoy | November 4, 2020

(Financial Times)

In this context, it is very useful to give a brief summary of the main issues that are involved in this political and, now, military conflict in Ethiopia. Therefore, in this article will be exposed some of the key elements that make it easier to understand what is going on in this country located in the Horn of Africa.

Historical context

In 1991, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) -a coallition that fostered ethnic federalism and formed by different ethnic-regional political parties- ousted Mengistu Haile Mariam and, hence, put an end to the marxist dictatorship that held power between 1987 and 1991. After that, in 1994, the EPRDF established a new Constitution based in ethnic and linguistic federalism. This allows to ethnic groups the possibility of self-administration but also the right to secession.

During the era of EPRDF’s dominance, the TPLF was the most important party, having governed between 1991 and 2012 (Meles Zenawi’s period). In 2018, Abiy Ahmed -a member of the Oromo Democratic Party (ODP)- became the first Oromo chairman of the EPRDF and he quickly demonstrated that he did not want to continue with the ethnic federalism that was imposed during 1991 and 2018. So, in 2019, he formed the Prosperity Party (PP), which is a merge of various political parties, including three of the four former members of the EPRDF. Only the TPLF decided to stay away from this national party.

In this scenario, the TPLF feared losing power (and influence) but also was worried about the economic paradigma of the PP, which is more liberal and gives more space to the private sector.

Political system in Ethiopia

1994’s Constitution established a parliamentary federalism in Ethiopia, which, moreover, is an ethnical federalism. The  Prime Minister is the Head of Government and the President is the Head of State. While the first one comes from the political party that wins the legislative elections and is chosen by the Parliament, the second one is appointed indirectly by the Parliament. This latter one is composed by the House of Federation and the House of People’s Representatives, which have 112 and 547 members, respectively. It is important to highlight that the House of Federation has a very particular distribution, as each of the ten regional states has a proportional number of representatives according to the number of nationality groups that reside in the state and the population of each one of them. Literally, article 61 of Ethiopia’s Constitution says the following:

Each Nation, Nationality and People shall be represented in the House of the Federation by at least one member. Each Nation or Nationality shall be represented by one additional representative for each one million of its population”.

There are ten regional states plus two cities with a special status (Addis Abeba and Dire Dawa). Each of the ten states have a wide range of self-administration and they even have the right to establish their own Constitution. Nevertheless, this latter one has to be subordinated to the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

Ethnics in Ethiopia

According to the 2007 census, there are 85 different ethnic groups and 87  mother tongues in the country. The Oromo (34.49%) and the Amhara (26.89%) are the biggest ones, followed by the Somali (6.21%) and the Tigray (6.07%). These four ethnicities sum up 82.66% of the Ethiopian population.  While the Amhara and the Tigray are mostly christians (orthodoxs, catholics and protestants), the Somali are muslims (sunna). The Oromo are mixed with two main majorities, which are the christians and muslims.

In terms of political power, the Tigray were dominant between 1991 and 2012, while the Amhara people were powerful under the monarchy era, which ended in 1974. The Oromo have been excluded from power in the modern history of Ethiopia. Concerning the Somalis, they are well known for their separatists movements.

Who is Abiy Ahmed?

He was born, in August 1976, in Beshasha, in the Oromia regional state. He was part of the forces that fought against Mengistu Haile Mariam’s dictatorship and also served in the Ethiopian military forces. He studied Computer Engineering and holds two Masters degrees, one in Leadership and another in Business Administration. In 2017, he obtained the degree of PhD in Philosophy, at Addis Abeba University, thanks to a final work about Peace and Conflict Research.

During a long period he was a political activist and in 2010 got a seat in the Ethiopian Parliament. After that, in 2015, he worked as Minister of Science and Technology.  Finally, in 2018, he was chosen as Prime Minister of the country, becoming the first Oromo to be appointed as Chairman of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).  He has been a member of the Oromo Democratic Party (ODP) and in 2019 he founded the Prosperity Party (PP).

He is the son of a muslim farmer and a christian orthodox woman, both of them from the Oromo ethnical group. Abiy Ahmed was free to chose his own beliefs and he is a well known protestant. His wife is an Amhara woman and they have four chilidren.

Once in power, on April 2 2020, he gained admiration as he and Isaias Afwerki ended the war that opposed Ethiopia and Eritrea and agreed to start a new era in their bilateral relation. Eritrea also restaured its ties with Somalia and, some months later, these two countries signed with Ethiopia an agreement of cooperation and peace in the region. Then, Djibouti and Eritrea normalized their ties after ten years of “freezing”.

Abiy Ahmed has an important participation in South Sudan’s peace process and in the transitional period in Sudan. He has been seen as a peacemaker and that is why he won, in October 2019, the Nobel Peace Prize.

Recent context

After coming to power, Abiy Ahmed has confronted the Tigray people as he is an oppositor to the ethnic and linguistic federalism of the country. Since then, his relation with the TPLF has not been good and that was remarked in December 2019, when Ahmed decided to end the ethnical-based EPRDF and founded the Prosperity Party. While all of the main former members of that coalition followed the steps of the Primer Minister, the TPLF chose not to be part of this new political party.

Then, in March 2020, Abiy Ahmed announced that the legislative elections, scheduled for August, were going to be postponed due to the Covid-19 pandemia. The Tigray did not accept his statement and said that Ahmed’s decision violated the Constitution. Therefore, the Tigray regional state organized and held their own regional elections on September 9. Ethiopia’s Prime Minister declared that the electoral process was illegal and did not recognize the results (the TPLF won 189 of the 190 seats).

In October, the Ethiopian Parliament decided to severe ties with the Tigray regional state. With this, Tigray’s regional budget was cut and the federal government of Ethiopia announced that they would continue the relations but only with local institutions.

In this context, during the last weeks the tension between Abiy Ahmed and the TPLF increased and on November 3, the TPLF said to the Tigray population that they should prepare for war. One day later, the military attack made by the TPLF was a reality and so was the response of the Ethiopian National Forces.

Implications of this political dispute

In Ethiopia, it could incite historical ethnical rivalries, such as the one between the Tigray and the Amhara, which, in fact, already have a territorial dispute. Also, it could spread the nationalist stances to another regional states. It should be said that this breakout between the Tigray regional state and the federal government could weaken the already unstable democratic institutionality of the country, something that, if it happens, could destabilize the Horn of Africa and, particularly, Eritrea. In relation to this latter one, Isaias Afwerki, current President (or dictador if we do not want to use euphemisms) has been a rival of the TPLF during the last years. He does not like the ethnical federalism and he has been constructing very good relations with Abiy Ahmed, so it is very obvious that he would stay beside the Ethiopian Prime Minister.

 If the conflict increases, it could also be very dangerous for the region, as during the last years -since Abiy Ahmed was appointed as Primer Minister- there have been efforts to resolve diplomatic and/or border disputes. Even more, the presence of international powers has been complicating the relations between Horn of Africa’s countries, as their own tensions -such as the one that Turkey and Qatar have with United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia- hinder or slow down the pace of the solution of conflicts in the region. So, in a conflict scenario, in which Ethiopia, Eritrea and even Sudan could be implicated, the external powers could also play their role in the dispute.

Concerning the ties between the Horn of Africa’s countries, it is necessary to remember that Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia have established an emerging alliance. They even suggested the creation of a new integration bloc (Horn of Africa Cooperation) and have exchanged official visits. This has been seen with some distance by other states of the region, like Djibouti and Kenya. This latter one, having a maritime delimitation conflict with Somalia. Furthermore, Sudan has been facing a transition period and regional confrontation or even only a crush between Ethiopia, Eritrea and the TPLF could be a menace or at least a problem to the Sudanese authorities. The articulation of the ties (among countries) in the Horn of Africa have a triple dimension (intra-Horn of Africa, between external powers and a merge of the first two ones) and, thus, the region has a very fragile balance.  

Finally, it should not be forgotten that there is a potential risk that the Qimant ethnic group -a minority within the Amhara regional state that demands autonomy- could make an Alliance with the TPLF, generating a clash between the Amhara, Tigray and Qimant. This issue has been deeply studied and analyzed by International Crisis Group.

Raimundo Gregoire Delaunoy

Comentarios (0)

Acercamiento Sudán-Israel: ¿un nuevo triunfo diplomático de Trump?

Etiquetas: , , , , , , , , , ,

Acercamiento Sudán-Israel: ¿un nuevo triunfo diplomático de Trump?

Fecha 23/10/2020 por Raimundo Gregoire Delaunoy

Gracias a la mediación del gobierno de Estados Unidos, liderado por su presidente, Donald Trump, se ha generado un nuevo hito en la agitada y siempre importante diplomacia de Medio Oriente. Así es que, siguiendo los pasos de Emiratos Árabes Unidos y Bahrein, Sudán se convirtió en el tercer país “árabe” que, durante 2020, establece relaciones diplomáticas con Israel.

Raimundo Gregoire Delaunoy | 23 de octubre de 2020

(Star Vision News)

Uno de los ejes de la política exterior de Donald Trump ha sido involucrarse, activa y directamente, en Medio Oriente y, particularmente, en el conflicto árabe-israelí. Es así que sus esfuerzos han estado dirigidos a conseguir nuevos reconocimientos de Israel y, específicamente, la generación de vínculos diplomáticos oficiales entre dicho país y sus pares árabes. Al respecto, todo se concretó el 13 de agosto del presente año, día en el cual Emiratos Árabes Unidos e Israel anunciaron el establecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas, lo cual fue seguido, el 15 de septiembre, por la normalización de los nexos entre Bahrein e Israel. Estos últimos, consolidarían el acercamiento el 18 de octubre, ya que en esa fecha generaron vínculos diplomáticos. En ambos casos, la injerencia y participación de Estados Unidos fue fundamental.

Luego de lo ocurrido con Emiratos Árabes Unidos, una serie de proyecciones y rumores empezaron a circular, los cuales intentaban dilucidar cuáles serían los siguientes estados del “mundo árabe” que seguirían los pasos de Emiratos Árabes Unidos. Se dijo que Arabia Saudita -por ser aliado de Estados Unidos y tener nexos secretos o subterráneos con Israel- podría ser un buen candidato, pero también se mencionó, entre otros, a Sudán, Bahrein, Omán e incluso Marruecos. Finalmente, Bahrein despejó las dudas y se sumó a la lista que integran Egipto (relaciones diplomáticas con Israel desde 1979), Jordania (1994) y Emiratos Árabes Unidos (2020). Tras la normalización entre Bahrein e Israel, se repitió el mismo ejercicio y nuevamente aparecieron los mismos nombres. Varios gobiernos comunicaron, en forma clara, que no reconocerían a Israel, ni tampoco establecerían vínculos diplomáticos. Así fue que Kuwait, Omán, Marruecos y Argelia, por dar algunos ejemplos, anunciaron que no cambiarían su postura respecto del conflicto palestino-israelí. Empero, con mucha fuerza se apuntó a Sudán, cuyo gobierno de transición entregó unas declaraciones algo difusas y que, desde esa perspectiva, permitió que aumentaran las especulaciones sobre un eventual avance de Estados Unidos e Israel en Sudán.

En septiembre y octubre, Sudán y Estados Unidos profundizaron las negociaciones y el diálogo sobre dos hechos fundamentales. Los africanos insistieron en que su contraparte estadounidense los sacara de la lista de patrocinadores del terrorismo, mientras que los norteamericanos buscaban un acuerdo sobre la indemnización por atentados ocurridos en 1998 (contra embajadas de Estados Unidos en Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, y Nairobi, Kenya) y 2000 (contra un destructor que estaba en las costas de Yemen). Al final, Sudán y Estados Unidos acordaron que el primero pagaría una indemnización de 355 millones de dólares, gracias a lo cual también se confirmó que Sudán sería eliminado del listado de países que apoyan al terrorismo. En medio de todo esto, diversas fuentes y distintos investigadores aseguraban que el establecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas entre Sudán e Israel estuvo sobre la mesa y que, de hecho, habría sido parte de las condiciones para alcanzar el acuerdo. Más allá de esto, lo concreto es que el 23 de octubre se produjo el anuncio, por parte del gobierno de Estados Unidos, de la normalización entre Sudán e Israel. Así, ambos estados generarían relaciones diplomáticas, algo que, de todas formas, aún no está confirmado. Básicamente, pues la normalización debe ser aprobada por el Consejo Legislativo, un órgano que aún no se ha conformado en Sudán. Esto último, pues el país se encuentra en pleno proceso de transición, la cual finalizará con elecciones en 2022. Al respecto, no se debe soslayar que el Consejo Legislativo estará integrado por diversos sectores de la sociedad civil y esto permite concluir que el establecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas entre Sudán e Israel podría quedar detenido. Por ejemplo, según el último sondeo de Arab Opinion Index, el 79% de los ciudadanos sudaneses encuestados aseguró que se oponía al reconocimiento de Israel, mientras que apenas un 13% se mostraba favorable a reconocer al estado israelí. Una demostración de aquello es que el sábado 24 de octubre hubo protestas, por el anuncio de normalizar los nexos con Israel, en las calles de Khartoum.

Volviendo al tema del acercamiento entre Sudán e Israel, es importante mencionar que Estados Unidos ha tenido una activa participación y, en este sentido, ha sido un nuevo triunfo para Donald Trump y Benjamin Netanyahu. Eso sí, queda la gran duda de cuánta validez tendrán estos progresos diplomáticos. Primero, pues, a días de las elecciones presidenciales estadounidenses, es lógico pensar que todos estos movimientos obedecen a la campaña electoral del actual mandatario de Estados Unidos. Junto a eso, queda la interrogante sobre qué pasaría en caso que Trump no logre la reelección. ¿Habrá una continuidad de la política exterior de Trump respecto de Israel?, ¿se le harán modificaciones o simplemente se tomará otra dirección en los asuntos de Medio Oriente? Luego, también es necesario mencionar que el reconocimiento de Israel, como un estado y una parte legítima al momento de dialogar, es fundamental para conseguir una solución a los antagonismos existentes en Medio Oriente. Sin embargo, para que esto ocurra, también debe ir acompañado de gestos por parte del estado israelí. Así, lo deseable sería que se anunciara el término de las anexiones, el establecimiento de los límites previos a 1967, el cese de las violaciones a los derechos humanos y, finalmente, llamar a negociaciones sobre la situación de Jerusalén y, específicamente, de Jerusalén Este. En la medida que Israel no haga esto, cualquier tipo de acercamiento con otros estados árabes carecerá de legitimidad y, de hecho, podría ser interpretado como un deseo de perpetuar el actual estado del conflicto.

En este contexto, es probable que otros gobiernos del “mundo árabe” establezcan relaciones diplomáticas con Israel, pero también es evidente que muchos otros no lo harán. Es el caso de Argelia, Marruecos, Líbano y Kuwait, quienes han expresado, con claridad, sus posturas. Lo de Omán es incierto, pues hubo un cambio en la dirección del país (un nuevo sultán) y habrá que ver si su política de neutralidad será mantenida. Qatar, como aliado de Turquía, seguramente no modificará su posición respecto de Israel, en tanto que Irak y Siria tampoco deberían realizar acercamientos. En este escenario, cabe agregar que Líbano e Israel acordaron resolver sus disputas limítrofes en el mar Mediterráneo, lo cual permite ver que los avances diplomáticos israelíes no solo apuntan a los vínculos diplomáticos oficiales, sino que también a conseguir acuerdos en materias complejas y de históricas dificultades. En línea con esto último, Israel es parte del recientemente lanzado Foro del Gas del Mediterráneo Oriental, el cual incluye a Chipre, Egipto, Grecia, Jordania e Italia. Además, Francia pidió ingresar al mismo. Esta alianza, teóricamente por los recursos naturales, es también un nuevo frente de combate entre Turquía y diversos países de dicha región, dentro de los cuales está Israel. En este contexto, sería interesante ver qué postura podría tener el Líbano. Si bien es cierto que un avance en las relaciones con Israel podría ser muy peligroso -el país se encuentra sumido en una profunda crisis, económica y social-, la integración regional podría ser beneficiosa para aumentar el Producto Interno Bruno (PIB). Así, la definición de los límites marítimos con Israel, podrían permitir al gobierno libanés la exploración y eventual explotación de los recursos gasíferos.

Turquía es, sin duda, el gran perdedor en esta oportunidad. Si bien hay otros derrotados, empezando por Palestina e Irán, Recep Tayyip Erdogan ha sufrido un duro revés, ya que, tras la caída de Omar al Bashir y la llegada de un gobierno de transición, el gobierno turco deseaba aumentar los nexos con Sudán y, en particular, aumentar su presencia e injerencia en dicho país. Esto último, continuando su lucha contra el bloque integrado por Arabia Saudita y Emiratos Árabes. En los últimos años, especialmente en la última década, los dos principales estados de la Península Arábiga han iniciado una fuerte y ascendente penetración en la geopolítica del Cuerno de África y Turquía deseaba contrarrestar el poder que estaba obtenidos sus dos rivales, con los cuales se enfrenta, además, en Libia (principalmente, Emiratos Árabes Unidos), el Mediterráneo Oriental (Emiratos Árabes Unidos) y en el conflicto palestino-israelí.

Por último, el acercamiento entre Sudán e Israel debiese traer consecuencias en el Cuerno de África. Básicamente, pues, en el largo plazo, los puertos de Eritrea, Djibouti y Somalía (también la región de Somaliland) tendrán que reacomodar sus fichas ante un eventual desarrollo de la infraestructura portuaria sudanesa. Además, Etiopía y Somalía habían acordado invertir en cuatro puertos del mar Rojo, lo cual podría chocar con eventuales inversiones de Arabia Saudita, Emiratos Árabes Unidos, Estados Unidos e Israel en los puertos y las costas de Sudán. Esto último se sumaría a la compleja presencia de diferentes países en la región, lo cual ha generado roces entre los gobiernos del Cuerno de África. Finalmente, Sudán podría maximizar su explotación petrolera y recuperar su importante rol en la zona. Sobre esto, queda la interrogante en relación al posible uso de Sudán como vía de entrada hacia países de la región que tienen buenos vínculos con Sudán.

Raimundo Gregoire Delaunoy

Comentarios (0)

Lecciones de Argelia y Sudán

Etiquetas: , , , , , , , , , ,

Lecciones de Argelia y Sudán

Fecha 11/04/2019 por Raimundo Gregoire Delaunoy

Con apenas unos días de diferencia, el argelino Abdelaziz Bouteflika y el sudanés Omar al Bashir debieron dejar el poder en sus respectivos países. Algunos dirán que eran presidentes y otros afirmarán que eran autócratas o tipos autoritarios. Sin embargo, es justo decir, en honor a la verdad, que la mano de hierro del sudanés no tiene comparación respecto a lo hecho por su par argelino, pero no se puede esconder que el régimen de Bouteflika excedió los tiempos y terminó por colmar la paciencia de los argelinos.

Raimundo Gregoire Delaunoy | 11 de abril de 2019

Bouteflika estuvo en el poder durante 20 años (1999-2019) y al Bashir lo superó en diez (1989-2019). Fueron gobernantes que, con diferentes estilos y en contextos muy particulares, pasarán a la historia por haber caído gracias a las protestas pacíficas del ciudadano común y a la intervención de las fuerzas armadas. Estas últimas, dejaron de apoyar a ambos y optaron por ponerse al lado de la gente. Claro, dirán que lo hicieron en forma estratégica, para así no perder sus regalías, es decir, buscarán un modelo democrático (o que al menos se acerque más a la democracia), pero sin perder su influencia y poder. La gran pregunta, en caso que esto sea así, es si los argelinos y sudaneses estarán dispuestos a eso. El pueblo está cansado y ya perdió el miedo.

Si bien años atrás cayeron Ben Alí (Túnez), Hosni Mubarak (Egipto); Ali Abdullah Saleh (Yemen) y Muammar al Gaddafi (Libia), lo ocurrido en Argelia y Sudán es muy simbólico. Básicamente, porque el proceso de caída de Bouteflika y al Bashir –especialmente en el caso del primero- fue menos sangriento. Mientras en Argelia no hubo muertos, en Sudán sí lo hubo (11 o 14, según distintas fuentes), pero al menos se evitó un choque frontal entre diversos grupos (civiles y estatales).

Sin embargo, ahora vendrá lo más difícil y, en este sentido, hay que tener mucha habilidad política. Hoy, las transiciones de ambos países están lideradas por los jerarcas militares, los mismos que fueron parte de los gabinetes de Abdelaziz Bouteflika y Omar al Bashir. Por ende, es natural que aparezcan dudas sobre hacia dónde irá el buque. En el caso argelino, ya se estableció que el 4 de julio habrá elecciones presidenciales y en ella no podrá participar el actual presidente interino (un cercano a Bouteflika). A su vez, la situación sudanesa es más incierta, pues recién ahora cayó el régimen de al Bashira. Por ahora, solo se sabe que habrá una transición de dos años (a cargo de los militares) y que, además, la Constitución será disueta. Junto a esto, habrá liberación de presos políticos, estado de emergencia por tres meses y toque de queda por un mes.

Al analizar lo que ocurre en Argelia y Sudán, se puede ver con claridad que la gente o, si se prefiere, el pueblo rechaza cualquier continuidad de los regímenes que acaban de caer. Esto es sumamente comprensible, pero, al mismo tiempo, muy peligroso. Es una espada de doble filo, pues ese ímpetu democrático puede ser el motor de una transición exitosa, pero también corre el riesgo de convertirse en una piedra de tope. Es muy complicado pensar en transar o ceder luego de dos o tres décadas dominado por dictadores (Al Bashir) u autócratas (Bouteflika), pero es necesario para que el paso desde una dictadura (o régimen autoritario) hacia una democracia sea lo más pacífico posible y, por ende, tenga un excelente resultado. Hemos visto lo ocurrido en Libia y esto debe ser puesto como ejemplo de cuán mal se pueden hacer las cosas. Al mismo tiempo, se puede examinar la transición chilena como un modelo interesante. No por cuestiones económicas –ya sabemos que fue la base de un sistema que tiene ahogado a la mayoría de los chilenos-, pero sí por la habilidad de haber salido de una larga dictadura, haber pasado con éxito los primeros años de frágil institucionalidad democrática y, finalmente, haber sido capaz de establecer una democracia como tal. Claro que se pueden mejorar aspectos, pero no se puede dudar que las dificultades propias del proceso fueron abordadas de buena forma.

Ahora, Areglia y Sudán deberán enfrentar la parte más compleja, que es dejar los festejos y empezar a trabajar para que todo lo acontecido genere cambios reales y no termine siendo, como en el caso de Egipto, una movida propia del Gatopardo. En este sentido, será un gran desafío para los argelinos y sudaneses, pero también para los países vecinos. En caso de necesitarse mediaciones, será fundamental que los mediadores sean estados del Magreb y del Cuerno de África, que son los espacios geopolíticos donde se desenvuelven Argelia y Sudán, respectivamente. Y si esto no fuese posible, entonces la Unión Africana debiese ser el organismo encargado de apoyar estos procesos. La injerencia extranjera, es decir, la participación de las grandes potencias (Estados Unidos, la Unión Europea, China y Rusia) y aquellas de tipo emergente (Turquía, Qatar, Arabia Saudita, Emiratos Árabes Unidos e Irán), debería ser evitada, para así no cometer los mismos errores del pasado, lo cual se ha visto –con historias, contextos y actores muy diferentes- en Siria, Afganistán, Irak, Libia y Malí. No se debe olvidar que los intereses geopolíticos son muy poderosos y que los estados más fuertes pueden asumir cambios en los liderazgos internos, pero que nunca estarán dispuestos a perder o poner en riesgos sus intereses (económicos, políticos, militares, etc.).

Por último, lo acontecido en Argelia y Sudán puede significar que lleguen nuevos aires en los procesos de integración del Magreb y del Cuerno de África, respectivamente. Mientras Argelia se ha visto involucrada en el conflicto del Sahara –apoyando al Polisario y, de esta forma, manteniendo con vida a un choque generado por el colonialismo y la Guerra Fría-, Sudán ha sido un factor de división en el siempre denso y complejo tejido diplomático del Cuerno de África. Es así que un gobierno argelino dispuesto a dialogar con Marruecos y establecer una política de dos velocidades (una dedicada al asunto del Sahara y otra que promueve la integración regional) aportaría mucho para el sueño de integración magrebí. En paralelo, los cambios generados por los nuevos tiempos de Abiy Ahmed, primer ministro de Etiopía, han generado expectación en el Cuerno de África, especialmente porque, al menos en el nivel diplomático, se ha avanzado en el camino de la solución de conflictos. Por ejemplo, la normalización de los nexos entre Etiopía y Eritrea y los avances (pequeños, medianos o grandes) en disputas como aquellas entre Egipto, Sudán y Etiopía (represa en el Nilo), Kenya y Somalia (límites marítimos), Djibouti y Eritrea (conflicto fronterizo) y Somalía y Somaliland (este último, una autoproclamada república cuyo territorio es parte de Somalía).

Además de esto, existen diversos proyectos de integración en infraestructura, lo cual tiene que ir acompañado de una base sólida de entendimiento entre los países de la región. Es así que en el Magreb se está avanzando en el proyecto de un tren magrebí –por ahora incluiría a Marruecos, Argelia y Túnez- y hace tiempo que se está llevando a cabo la carretera transahariana, mientras que, en el Cuerno de África, hace poco fue inaugurada la línea de ferrocarril que une a Etiopía con Djibouti, pero existen otras iniciativas ferroviarias como las líneas Etiopía-Eritrea, Etiopía-Kenya y Kenya-Sudán del Sur. Por si fuese poco, estos proyectos ferroviarios involucran a Rwanda, República Democrática del Congo, Tanzania, Burundi y Uganda, lo cual generaría una gran conectividad terrestre en África Oriental. ¿Algo más? Claro, porque existe el deseo de construir el “Corredor Lamu” –que incluiría, entre otras cosas, carreteras, puertos, líneas de tren y un oleoducto-, el cual uniría a Kenya, Sudán del Sur, Etiopía y Uganda.

En resumen, el fin de los regímenes de Abdelaziz Bouteflika y Omar al Bashir dejan una serie de lecciones y desafíos. Dentro de las primeras, la importancia de realizar manifestaciones pacíficas (y persistentes), la necesidad de actuar en forma rápida cuando una situación amenaza con transformarse en un choque violento, aprender a escuchar a la gente, comprender que los tiempos actuales necesitan soluciones democráticas y no dictatoriales y asumir que ningún tipo de gobierno puede mantenerse en el tiempo si no toma medidas que favorezcan a la mayoría y no a las élites. Entre los segundos, cómo construir nuevas institucionalidades democráticas, entender que las democracias africanas o asiáticas no tienen por qué ser iguales a las de “Occidente”, implicar a todos los segmentos políticos y étnicos en los procesos de democratización y fomentar la creación de un nuevo sistema interno que permita establecer, en el largo plazo, buenas relaciones con los vecinos. Todo lo anterior, comprendiendo que se vive en un mundo globalizado y en el cual los estados (o estados-nación) van perdiendo fuerza ( y a veces soberanía) respecto de los bloques de integración (regional, continental o mundial).

En este contexto, es de esperar que los procesos de Argelia y Sudán terminen bien. Aquello sería un bálsamo en zonas que, en las últimas décadas, han vivido procesos complejos y, normalmente, acompañados de violencia, fragmentación e inestabilidad. Mientras África no solucione sus problemas, la dependencia de los capitales extranjeros seguirá siendo una realidad y, entonces, la utilización de sus recursos naturales (y las riquezas generadas por éstos) permanecerá bajo la voluntad de las potencias o, si se prefiere, de las grandes empresas que los exploran y explotan.

Comentarios (0)

African countries processes to follow in 2018

Etiquetas: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

African countries processes to follow in 2018

Fecha 28/12/2017 por Raimundo Gregoire Delaunoy

With the arrival of a new year, it is important to analyze some important topics that will fill the African agenda of international and specifically, interafrican, issues during the current year. So, this article will present some countries that should be tracked in 2018 as they will possibly face important changes and strong (and sometimes hard) sociopolitical processes.

Raimundo Gregoire Delaunoy | December 28th, 2017

(Fotografía: Agencias)

Only by looking the electoral calendar of Africa for 2018 it seems that it will be an important year. There will be nine presidential elections and 15 legislative ones, which will be complemented with others like local elections, referendums or municipal processes. Even more, Cameroon, Egypt, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, Madagascar, Mauritius, Sierra Leona, South Sudan and Zimbabwe will choose a new President. So, just talking about elections it will be a year full of expectations.

At the same time, there are key events that are developing in Africa and that, obviously, will be part of 2018’s agenda por this continent. For example, the dispute of the Nile, the tasks of the new chief of the MINURSO, the immigration issues in Northern Africa but also in Eastern and Central Africa, the transformation of the African Union, advances in the African integration, the rise of terrorism, the drug traffic routes and the fight against hunger, among others. Different and tough challenges for a continent that has improved in a lot of aspects but that still confronts eternal social conflicts and, surely, a lack of a deeper integration as a whole. As Julius Nyerere declared, the fragmentation of Africa still causes damage to the path that will give Africans better life conditions.

In the following paragraphs, the context of different countries will be analyzed, so that the study of such a huge continent can be realized in a less dense way.


Abdelfatah Al Sisi’s announcement of running for the presidential election – which should be held on Mars 26th– confirmed what all Egyptians knew, it is, he will not hold out­ the power and he will continue with his ambitions. And if there was any doubt in relation to his rivals, now everything is clear, as all of the other candidates have ended their presidential dream and al Sisi’s victory is only a matter of time.

It is true that he saved the country from the Muslim Brotherhood -a group that tried to be seen as a moderate islamist political party but that finally tried to establish changes that would have conducted Egyptian society into a more conservative one- but Egypt still faces the problem of discrimination against women, Christian minorities (nearly 10% of the country’s population) and secular sectors of the society.­ Also, the threat of terrorism is very active in the Egyptian territory and specially in the Sinai. The attacks of last months are a demonstration of this and reflect the fragile security context of the country. The situation worsens if the analysis deepens in topics like the economic reality of Egypt, the corruption and the strong-hand leadership of al Sisi, who never hesitates before sending to prison political rivals, islamists, ONGs representatives and anyone who opposes to him.

Even if the lack of civilian liberties has been a problem through decades, there was a hope that after Hosni Mubarak’s fall a new paradigm could be established, specially in freedom to express, religious liberty and, maybe the most important, the end of that deep and strong relation between politics and military in the government or power. Sadly, none of those situations have changed and, even worse, Egypt faces 2018 with lot of problems and big challenges in those issues. Then, it will be a key moment for the future of the country. The reforms are waiting and al Sisi has the opportunity to rectify the path and give, once again, hope to the Egyptians.


If there is a country that faces a crucial year for its social, political and economic re-order, it is Libya. Since the fall of Muammar al Gaddafi (in 2011), the former stable country has become into a semi-failed state. Two governments and two Parliaments, slavery, immigration crisis, difficulties for the oil production and social discontent. Also, the strong menace of Al Qaida of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State, among other terrorist groups. So, the Libyan scenario doesn’t seem to be very well during 2018. Nevertheless, there are some challenges for the Maghrebian country.

During the last months was revealed the existence of numerous human-trafficking networks and, even worse, the practice of slavery in the Libyan territory. The dramatic issue generated summits, meetings and political compromises in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Maghreb, the European Union and the Organization of the United Nations (ONU), among others. However, this conflict should be solved as possible and, therefore, has to be one of the priorities for the Libyan authorities.

The problem is that in 2018 the expectations turn around two sociopolitical key facts, it is, the reconciliation process that brings with itself a new Constitution for the country and the correct realization of the presidential and legislative elections. Thus, the first step is to work for the re-construction of the state infrastructure, as with this goal being achieved all the further projects should be faced with more strength and order. This is why the oil situation is other of the key topics for Libya in 2018. Since 2017, the numbers of oil production and exportation have been showing a positive trend, so one of the ambitions should be the consolidation of this process. With oil, new Constitution, national reconciliations and a stronger and better state apparatus, the other challenges –as fight against immigration (and slavery), terrorism, separatism and ethnic conflicts (tebou and amazigh claims) should be developed in a better context, it is, one with high levels of chaos and violence but at least with the hope given by a newly created process of rebirth of the Libyan state and society.

South Sudan

The peace talks have failed and the future of the country will be shaped, once again, by violence, poverty and other conflicts associated to the main problem, that is, hunger, displacement and immigration. To avoid this, or at least soften the consequences, the efforts of the international community (and the government, of course) should be directed to the cessation of hostilities. In this scenario, the AU5 (an African Union commission of five countries) will have the great opportunity to recover the path and return the trust to an African solution as external powers like the European Union have not been able to establish as a trustful partner in this process.

The Nile conflict

Recently, Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia met in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Abeba, to solve the dispute about the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which has been involving these three countries and other ones, as Eritrea, in the conflict. While the image of seeing the governments of the three named states trying to find a final agreement is a positive step, the fact that Sudanese troops were deployed in the Eritrean border makes it impossible to assure that the problem will be ended in a peaceful way. Even more, the “Nile Conflict” involves countries that normally have faced diplomatic and/or military confrontations. That is the case, for example, of the ties between Sudan and Egypt, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Sudan and Eritrea and Ethiopia and Egypt. So, it is clear that a little spark could start a big fire and, therefore, the “Nile Conflict” should be solved as soon as possible.

Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali and Zimbabwe: recovery through presidential elections

For different reasons, this countries have been fighting for establishing a re-order of its social, political and economic situation. In Cameroon, the Anglophone region –which waves the flag of separatism- continues to give strong headaches to the government and riots that still generate disorder and, the worst, deaths. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the challenge of eradicating the ‘Kabila Clan’ from the control of the country has been a very tough issue. So, the main goal in this giant state should be the organization and development of transparent and democratic elections. In Mali, another African semi-failed state, the division is still a great obstacle in the process of re-order of a country that has been facing conflicts –separatism of the Azawad region, rise of terrorism groups that formerly were not active in the Malian territory, consolidation of the governments power and drug and human trafficking- since 2012. Finally, in Zimbabwe, the end or Robert Mugabe’s era was a very good step but the next challenges seem to be even more difficult and heavy. The construction of a new state –as Mugabe was the only leader in the independent Zimbabwe-, which implies the modernization of the political structure and a huge change in the Zimbabwean social map is just the beginning of a long process.

So, these countries will need to do well in the presidential elections that will be held during 2018. Not only for having a president but, the most important, to return the hope of a better future for their population. Wars, divisions and corruption should be left aside and the African community should be able to help in this process. The same for the United Nations.

The Horn of Africa and the challenge of facing intern and extern sources of conflicts

Al Shabaab’s presence in Somalia is just enough to be worried about this region but if we add the recent political (and social) convulsions in Kenya –due to the still contested presidential election’s results- the outlook gets darker. Unfortunately, the Yemen conflict and the Arab-Iran-Turkey crisis have splitted into the Horn of Africa and, specially, into Somalia, a country that needs the help of states like United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey. About this latter context, the situation seems to be very cloudy, as the net of political supports has been changing in the last months and still is in motion.

Therefore, 2018 should be an opportunity to demonstrate that Somalia and Kenya –but also Ethiopia, which has given some tiny hints of a depressurization of the social and political situation- can reach balanced and strategic diplomacy objectives, in order that the Horn of Africa can avoid more tension in the region and, in consequence, to prevent a high risk of conflict. The decision that will be made in relation to Al Shabaab, ties with external powers, the Nile issue and political reconciliation will be key elements.

The Maghrebian context

Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania can be categorized as countries that have maintained the status quo and, also, the equilibrium in their social and political aspects. Surely, with risks –among others, Bouteflika’s health and Kabilia’s movement in Algeria; the social protests in the Rif and the raise of the life’s cost in Morocco; and the authoritarian rule of Abdelaziz in Mauritania- but with some stability. Different is the situation of Libya (already analyzed) and Tunisia. This latter has confronted economic crisis, political disfunction and protests of Tunisians that year after year lose hope of the country’s recovery.

Nevertheless, there is a silent topic that should be observed with a lot of care during 2018. It is the relation between Morocco and the Polisario and Algeria, which should change as in 2017 two important facts took place. The first, and most important, the official return of Morocco into de African Union. The second, the appointment of the Canadian Colin Stewart  and the German Horst Kohler as the new head of the MINURSO and as the new General Secretary Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, respectively.

With these movements and the permanent hostilities witnessed along 2018, the Sahara conflict should not be forgotten. Even if the risk of a military conflict is nearly nonexistent, the political consequences of this issue could threaten, once again, the political cohesion of the Maghreb and regional blocks of integration, including the African Union.

Countries looking for the democratization of their state and society

For different reasons, Equatorial-Guinea, Central African Republic, Angola, South Africa and Madagascar have the obligation of advancing towards democracy and/or social reconstruction. In Equatorial Guinea, Teodoro Obiang Nguema has been in power for 38 years and is the oldest African governor. In December, he faced another coup attempt and, as all the previous ones, he survived. However, the opposition will not stop their fight, even if the use of military abuses (detentions and repression) is one of the most recurrent strategies of the current government in order to confront the political and social rivals.

Central African Republic is still facing one of the most difficult and long peace processes in Africa, so in 2018 the goal is to achieve more objectives and to continue fostering arrangements, reconciliation and social peace. Concerning, Angola, South Africa and Madagascar, they will have new challenges. In Angola, there is a new (and younger) president, while in South Africa the corruption scandals are a big threat to Zuma’s era. Finally, Marc Ravalomanana, ousted and exiled president of the country, will try to return to power after he suffered a coup d’etat in 2009. He will do that amid political, economic and social crisis, so the scenario does not seem to be very calm in 2018.

Nigeria, the big leader in trouble

Oil? Not really. Sure it will be one of the most important topics, which explains many of economic,political or social processes that take place in Nigeria, but during 2018 the agenda should keep a special place for the territory conflicts. The first of them is one already known and is the current presence of Boko Haram in different regions of the country and, mainly, in the northeast part of the territory. Nevertheless, the main issue will be the territorial disputes between farmers (of Central region of Nigeria) and nomadic herdsmen (coming from the North), a conflict that should worsen due to the difficulties to find the necessary amount of water for agricultural activities and works. The clashes have already erupted and only in 2016 they took the life of nearly 2.500 people, a number that should be analyzed with special attention in a country that has within its margins more than 100 ethnical groups and also faces the threat of separatists from Biafra and terrorists of Boko Haram.

Liberia, with the hope of better times

With George Weah recently sworned as the new President of the country, Liberia starts a new political cycle, in which a former football star will be in charge of changing the country’s image but, the most important, of strengthening the sociopolitical transition that has been taking place in the westerner African state. The challenge will be very big, the same as the hopes and expectations of seeing a well carried transition in this state used, unfortunately, to see riots, political division and lack of democracy.

Final comments

Apart from the conflicts that were described in the previous paragraphs, it should be said that Africa, as a continent, will be facing problematic trends or contexts such terrorism, integration difficulties, fight against corruption, fragile situation of some states, economic growth, gender equality, relations with the European Union and United States of America and the advance of Turkey, China, Qatar, Saudia Arabia, Iran and United Arab Emirates.

These big challenges will be an opportunity for Africa, a continent that should demonstrate to itself and to the world –particularly, to the major powers- that African countries and leaders have the capacity and the will to affront this situations. In this context, the reform of the African Union, specially those about the origin of the funds, should have an important place and weight in the African agenda of 2018.

Comentarios (0)


Etiquetas: , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Indicadores sociales del Cuerno de África

Fecha 15/06/2017 por Raimundo Gregoire Delaunoy

Conocida por ser una de las regiones del mundo con más conflictos, es una de las zonas más relevantes dada su ubicación geográfica. Es así que se convierte en un paso comercial que une Asia con Europa, pero también es el lugar de enfrentamientos geopolíticos entre diversos actores regionales y mundiales.

Más allá de lo anterior, es necesario conocer, a grandes rasgos, cuáles son los principales datos de esta región, la cual tiene a países tan diferentes como Djibouti, Eritrea, Etiopía, Kenya, Sudán y Sudán del Sur. Además, se deben sumar Puntland y Somaliland, entidades territoriales pertenecientes a Somalía, pero que funcionan como territorios autónomos.

Producto Interno Bruto
(Fuente: FMI)

Producto Interno Bruto | Variación porcentual
(Fuente: FMI)

Otros indicadores socioeconómicos

Indicadores de diversa índole

GSIGlobal Slavery Index 2018
FW Freedom in the World 2019
FoPFreedom of Press 2019 (RSF)
GGRGlobal Gender Gap Report 2018
DIDemocracy Index The Economist 2018
CRIGlobal Climate Risk Index 2019
GPIGlobal Peace Index 2018
CPICorruption Perceptions Index 2018 – Transparency International
GTIGlobal Terrorism Index 2018
GRRGlobal Risk Report 2019 – World Economic Forum
WRIWorld Risk Index 2018
GCIGlobal Competitiveness Index 2018 – World Economic Forum
FSIFragile States Index 2018
IDHÍndice de Desarrollo Humano
PIBpcProducto Interno Bruto per cápita
ESPVEsperanza de vida
POB Población

Comentarios (0)

Los desafíos del Covid-19

En diciembre de 2019 comenzaba uno de los momentos más complicados del siglo XXI. Mientras el mundo seguía con su cotidianeidad, China se esforzaba para ocultar el avance de una nueva gripe, pero que, a diferencia de otras, parecía ser demasiado contagiosa y letal.

[…] Seguir leyendo


La integración político-social africana es:

View Results

Cargando ... Cargando ...